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SUMMARY: The Petitioners, who are construction contractors 
and their agents in the Philadelphia area, negotiated and signed 
a collective bargaining agreement providing for a union hiring 
hall. Without the employers' knowledge, the union operated the 
hiring hall in a racially discriminatory manner. The Petitioners 
ask this Court to consider: 
'·~ t 
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1. Whether 42 U.S.C. §1981 permits a court to hold the 
employers liable for injunctive relief for racial discrimination 
committed by the union, when the Respondents have not proved that 
the employers acted with discriminatory intent. 
2. Whether the employers and their agents can be held 
vicariously liable for the union's racial discrimination in the ---------
operation of the hiring hall. 
FACTS: The Respondents, a class of black job-seekers, 
brought this action alleging that Local 542 and JATC, a local 
apprenticeship training committee, had discriminated against 
blacks in the operation of the hiring hall, in violation of Title 
VII and 42 U.S.C. §1981. The complaint also named one employer 
(who was later certified as the representative of a sub-class of 
1400 employers) and four trade associations as defendants. 
After a trial, 1 the District Court found that the hiring 
hall system created in the collective bargaining agreement 
between the union and the employers was nondiscriminatory and 
created a bona f ~e -se~rity sys; em. The court stated that the 
Petitioners' allegations of discrimination were "not directed 
against the hiring hall system per se but against the union's 
1The trial court divided the litigation into two stages. Stage 
I involved only claims against the employers and trade 
associations as a class. S~I, which has not yet begun, will 




alleged intentional refusal to follow their own hiring hall 
rules." After reviewing the evidence, the fou?f held that the 
union had violated both Title VII and §1981, and that ___, -violated §1981. 
The court also found that trade associations and contractors 
"viewed simply as a class" were not "actually aware of the union 
discrimination," and that the plaintiffs had failed to "show an 
intent to discriminate by the employers as a class." 
Nevertheless, "whether or not the [Petitioners] knew or should 
have known" of the union's discrimination, the court held that 
they were liable for injunctive relief under §1981 "as a result 
of their contractual relationship to and use of a hiring hall 
system which in practice effectuated intentional discrimination." 
The court mandated extensive equitable relief against the union 
and the employers. The trade associations were ordered to pay a 
percent~ge of the costs of the remedial program mandated by the 
decree. 
HOLDING: The Court of Appeals unanimously affirmed the 
portion of the judgment holding that the union and the 
apprenticeship committee had intentionally discriminated against 
the Respondents. The cou~t~f1 irmed, by an equally divided vote 
(and thus without opinion), that portion of the judgment holding 
II 
the employers and trade associations liable for injunctive 





1. The Petitioners contend that the court below held that 
proof of intent to discriminate is not requried for an action 
brought under §1981, and tht consequently, the decision conflicts 
with the decisions of several other circuits. 2 The Petitioners 
also argue that it makes no sense to hold them responsible to the 
union's actions since they have no control over the operation of 
the union hiring hall. 
2. The Petitioners also object that the District Court 
incorrectly held that they are vicariously liable under §1981 for 
the discriminatory actions of the union and JATC. In reaching 
this holding the court relied not on §1981 case authority, but on 
analagous ~ases decided under Act, 
Title VII, and the common law doctrine of respondeat superior. 
I 
The Petitioners claim that holding them vicariously liable in a 
§1981 action conflicts with the reasoning in Monell v. Department 
of Social Services, 436 u.s. 658 (1978), which held, in the 
2The Petitioners have cited Guardians Ass'n v. Civil Service 
Comm'n, 633 F.2d 232 (CA 2 1980); Williams v. De Kalb County, 582 
F.2d 2 (CA 5 1978); Mescall v. Burrus, 603 F.2d 1266 (CA 7 1979); 
Donnell v. General Motors Corp., 576 F.2d 1291 (CA 8 1978); Craig 
v. County of Los Angeles, 626 F.2d 659 (CA 9 1980), cert. denied, 
101 S.Ct. 1364 (1981); Chicano Police Officer's Ass'n v. Stover, 
552 F.2d 918 (CA 10 1977). But see Kinsey v. First Regional 
Securities, Inc., 557 F.2d 830, 838 n.22 (CA D.C. 1977). 
The Petitioners also note that this Court granted a petition for 
certiorari in County of Los Angeles v. Davis, 440 U.S. 625 
(1979), on precisely this question. The case, however, was 
decided on other grounds. 
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context of municipal liability, that vicarious liability was not 
applicable in actions brought under §1983. According to the 
Petitioners, since the Reconstruction Congress enacted §§1981 and 
1983 within a year of each other, Congress' intent regarding 
vicarious liability is the same for each section. 
3. The Petitioners also argue that their class of employers 
and trade associations was improperly certified as class under 
Rule 23 of the Fede ral Rules of Civil Procedure. Rule 23(a} 
permits class certification only if the claims and defenses of 
the class representatives are typical of the class, and if the 
factual issues litigated at trial are common to class members. 
The Petitioners argue that if intent discriminate is a required 
element of a §1981 action, then many factual and legal issues 
will not be common to the class members, and the class 
representative will not be able to represent properly the 
interests of class members. The Petitioners also argue that even 
if class certification was proper, the court incorrectly 
certified the defendant class under Rule 23(b} (2} instead of Rule 
23(b} (3}. Only the latter provision gives the class membe rs the 
opportunity to "opt out" of the class and defend the suit 
individually. Without the opportunity to opt out, and because 
notice under Rule 23(b} (2} is discretionary, Petitioners will be 
liable for costly injunctive relief without notice of the suit or 
a chance to defend. Moreover, the decision to certify the class 
under Rule 23(b} (2} conflicts with Paxman v. Campbell, 612 F.2d 
848, 854 (CA 4 1980} (en bane}, cert. denied, 101 S. Ct. 951 
- 7 -
(1981), which held that defendant classes could be certified only 
under Rules 23 (b) (1) and (b) (3). 
4. The Respondents insist that the issue before this Court 
is not whether liability can be imposed under §1981 without a 
finding of discriminatory intent, but whether the court properly 
imputed the undisputed discriminatory intent of the union to the 
employers and trade associations. The Respondents fear that 
unless the court holds the employers vicariously liable for 
injunctive relief, the Respondents will never be made whole. 
The Respondents also argue that class certification under 
Rule 23(b) (3) would foreclose defendant class actions. They find 
Paxman dis~inguishable from the present case since Paxman did not 
involve class wide policies, whereas the present case involves a 
class of defendants, each of whom have acted pursuant to the same 
illegal hiring hall policies. 
DISCUSSION: Because the court below affirmed the decision 
of the District Court by an equally divided vote, it did not 
issue an opinion. Consequently, the judgment below neither is 
precedent in the Third Circuit nor conflicts with the decisions 
of other circuits. 
The District Court found that the union was liable under 
§1981 for intentional discrimination in the operation of the 
hiring hall. The court also found that the Petitioners did not 
~\. 
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discriminate against the Respondents, and in fact found that they 
had no knowledge of the union's discriminatory policies. 
~--
However, the Respondents are correct that the court did not hold 
the Petitioners liable because a §1981 action does not require 
proof of intent. Rather the court held that the Petitioners were 
vicariously liable for injunctive relief as a class because of 
~--------------,------------------------
the contractual relationship between the Petitioners and the 
union. 
This Court has not decided whether a party can be held 
vicariously liable in a §1981 action for the intentionally 
discriminatory actions of other parties. In Monell, this Court 
held that a municipality could not be held vicariously liable in 
a §1983 action for the acts of its employees. The Court's 
holding stemmed both from the language of §1983 and the Court's 
reluctance to create a federal law of respondeat superior. 
Even though the Petitioners have good arguments for their 
conclusion that Congress' intent regarding vicarious liability is 
the same for §1983 and §1981, this case may not merit review: 
the absence of any circuit decisions on this issue deprives this 
Court of the opportunity to rule after circuits courts have 
debated the issue. 
If the District court correctly decided that the employers 
may be held vicariously liable for the discriminatory acts of the 





this case as a class action: under a theory of vicarious 
liability the individual claims and defenses of the Petitioners 
are irrelevant to the decision to award class wide injunctive 
relief. Nonetheless, the District Court decision to certify the 
Petitioners' class under Rule 23(b) (2) conflicts with the Fourth 
Circuit's decision in Paxman v. Campbell, 612 F.2d 848 (CA 4 
1980), which held that defendant classes may be certified only 
under 23 (b) (1) or (b) (3). The conflict with Paxman is illusory, 
however, since the District Court in the present case also held 
that the Petitioners were certifiable as a class under 
23 (b) (1) (A). This issue is not certworthy. 
I recommend denial. 
There is a response. 
9/30/81 Dwyer Opinion in the petition 
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To: Mr. Justice Powell February 27, 1982 
From: David Levi 
81-280: Gen. Building Contractors Assn v. Penn. et al 
81-330: United Engineers & Constructors v. Pennsylvania et al 
81-331: Contractors Assn of Eastern Penn et al v. Penn. et al 
81-332: Glasgow, Inc. v. Pennsylvania et al 
81-333: Bechtel Power Corp. v. Pennsylvania et al 
Questions Presented 
I. Were the contractors and contractor's 
associations properly held liable under 42 u.s.c. §1981 for 
r-
2. 
the discriminatory acts of the union despite a finding that 
they had no intent to discriminate, had no knowledge of the 
discrimination and did not cause the discrimination? 
II. Did the district court properly certify a class 
of defendants? 
III. Did the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania have 
standing to sue on its own behalf or as parens patriae? 
I. Facts and Decision Below 
The CA3 affirmed by and 
without opinions. Judge Higginbotham 
• 
is well over 200 pages in length--as you must have dtvined 
from the incredible mountain of paper in this matter. 
A. The Parties 
This employment discrimination suit was begun in 
1971 by 12 black plaintiffs on behalf of a class of minority 
workers in the operating e~neer trade in Eastern 
Pennsylvania and Delaware. The Commonwealth of Pennsylvania 
also sued on behalf of the class and its citizens generally. 











The defendants are as follows: (1) Local 542 of the 
International Union of Operating Engineers--the union and the 
main culprit in the litigation; ( 2) a "class" of defendants 
"headed" by Glasgow, Inc, and consisting of over 1400 
construction contractors receiving referrals through the 
union's hiring hall; ( 3) a class of employer trade 
associations headed by four construction trade associations; 
and (4) the Joint Apprenticeship Training Committee 
an organization created by the union and 
associations for the training of new engineers. 
The four trade associations do 
•' 
construction or employ operating engineers. 
not 
They 
engage in ;-~ 
. ~~ 
are serv1ce 
organizations that act as collective bargaining agents for .-w....o 
..e..c....~ . 
They / certain of the local employers when requested to do so. 
~~ 
do not control any building contractors or union. Each of the , 
four were signatories to the 1961 collective bargaining ~r. 
agreement with Local 542 by which the hiring hall was 
established. The four associations represent approximately 
20% of the local contractors who make up the class of 
defendant employers. 
The certified class of defendant contractors 
""(~ 
includes '6..ocal contractors who have entered into collective 
bargaining agreements directly with Local 542. It also 
includes large national contractors such as Bechtel who 
negotiate national 
construction trades 
. ' ... 
labor agreements with the national 
unions. These national agreement 
4. 
typically incorporate local labor standards, including hiring 
halls, if any. 
The JATC was established in 1965 by the contractor 
associations and local 542. It is administered by 6 trustees-
-three picked by the associations and three picked by the 
Local. The apprenticeship program administered by JATC lasts 
4 years and involves classroom and field training. Once 
admitted to the program the apprentice becomes a member of 
Local 542, and upon completion of training becomes eligible 
for referral to heavy equipment jobs by the hiring hall. 
B. The Hiring Hall Agreement 
At the center of this litigation is the Local's /L,...,,."'~-/r 
'l__ :_. 
discriminatory operation of the exclusive hiring hal~
Following a strike in 1961, the local contractor association~··~ 
t k greed to a hiring hall provisio~\ in the collective bargaining
agreement. Under this provision ~11 contractors who perform 
work with union labor, within the jurisdiction of Local 542, 
are contractually obligated to use Local 542' s hiring hall 
when employing operating engineers. By the terms of the 
agreement the Local maintains lists of operating engineers, or 
would-be engineers, in 4 categories defined by hours of 
experience. When an employer needs an operating engineer, he 
notifies the Local and within 24 hours will receive a 
referral. List I engineers get priority, then List II and so 
on. One's position on a particular list depends on the date 
of registration certifying availability for work. 
I ' 
'· ' .. 1 . 
• 1· 
5. 
The referral system is the only way an employer may 
hire an engineer--except on a permanent, full-time basis. 
However, the employer may refuse to employ the employee who is 
referred. Another referral will then be made which the 
employer can again accept or refuse. The local is divided 
into five districts, each with its own referral lists and 
hiring hall. 
Article II, §2 of the collective bargaining 
agreement provides that referrals from the hiring hall are to 
be made on a non-discriminatory basis. The district judge 
found that "[t]he hiring hall system is on its face neutral 
and purports to create a bona fide seniority sytem. II 
Plaintiffs' allegations were "not directed against the hiring 
hall system per se but against the union's alleged intentional 
refusal to follow their own hiring hall rules, thus causing 
intentional discrimination against and a di scr imina tory 
adverse impact on mi~orities." 
C. Findings of Discrimination 
"-- --
There is no dispute that the union in its operation 
of the hiring hall and the JATC in its recruitment programs . 
~ intentionally discriminated against blacks. These two ,---
defendants have not appealed the district court's finding of 
liability~ they are not now before the Court as petitioners. 
The district court based its finding of discrimination on 
plaintiffs' proof of g;oss statistical ~isparity in union 






referrals between blacks and whites. In addition to 
statistical evidence of discrimination, the plaintiffs 
demonstrated that were in practice white entry channels into 
the union and black entry channels, and that only the black / 
, 
entry channels required testing and apprenticeship. A barrage 
of anecdotal evidence pertaining to individual workers, black 
and white, was found to reveal a pattern of discrimination 
against blacks in the number and quality of referrals and 
entry to the union. Blacks tended to get referrals for lower 
paying and shorter term employment. 
The district court also found that the union had 
consistently and intentionally supplied inaccurate information 
to the federal government as to the percentage of minority 
members in the union. In 1968 the federal government 
threatened to cut off funds to contractors in the Philadelphia 
area unless greater numbers of minority workers were hired. 
The government proposed an affirmative action plan known as 
• , I 
the "Philadelphia Plan." In a June, 1968 meeting between 
~ _____.. 
members of the Office of Federal Contract Compliance and 
officials of Local 542, however, an Affirmative Action Program 
-----------------------------~ wa agreed to in lieu of the Philadelphia Plan. This Plan was 
less stringent than the proposed Philadelphia Plan and 
preserved the union's control of hiring. The four 
contractor's associations also joined the agreement. The 
district judge found that the federal government had been 
induced to agree to this less stringent plan on the basis of 
.. 
7. 
false and exaggerated data as to minority membership in the 
union. He found a deliberate scheme by the Local to mislead 
the federal government. He found further that the 
associations had been reckless in signing their names to a 
document that misrepresented minority membership in the union. 
As to the Joint Apprenticeship Training Committee, 
the district judge found that particularly statistics 
pertaining to entry into the program revealed intentional 





that the trial and judgment below concerned ~ '-
and injunctive relief. Damages (e.g. backpay) ~~ 
-were to be determined in a later - pro~eeding. 
1. The Union and JATC 
The Local was the main culprit in the litigation.~ 
As the district judge stated, "'[a] t the core of this class 
action is plaintiffs' Title VII ••• claim against Local 542 
for employment discrimination." The court found that 
plaintifffs had shown intentional discrimination as well as 
disparate impact discrimination. 
In addition to Title VII, the union was also fo ------...---..- d to 
have ___ v_l_·o_l_:_t_e_d ____ §_l_981 (same right to contract as white 
citizens). The court found that its finding of intentional 
discrimination on the part of the Local was decisive as to 
liability under §1981 as well. Moreover, on the basis of the 
8. 
Ninth Circuit's opinion in Davis v. County of Los Angeles (the 
Court had not yet decided the case), the district court found 
that a §1981 violation by the union could rest on proof of 
discriminatory impact alone. See page 140 ("I therefore adopt 
the view that a §1981 employment discrimination claim may be 
proven on rougly the same basis as a Title VII claim, 
including proof of disparate impact alone."). 
As I have noted above, the union has not challenged 
these findings and is not now before the Court. 
2. The Association and the Contractors 
The district judge also found liability on the part 
of the associations and contractors. (pages 141-168) It is 
this finding that is now before the Court. The employers were 
not sued under Title VII. They faced liability under §§1981 
and 1985 of the Civil Rights Acts. 
a.~
Despite some evidence to the contrary, the court 
found "that plaintiffs have failed to prove on a 
preponderance the evidence that the associations or 
contractors viewed simply as a class were actually aware of 
the union discrimination affecting the employment of minority 
persons." p. 142. He found further "that not all contractors 
and associations may be said as a class to have had reasonable 
notice of the union's discrimination in view of the great 




their work." Even so he found that the contractors and 
association were "injunctively liable to the plaintiff class 
under §1981 as a result of their contratual relationship to 
and use of a hiring hall system which in practice effectuated 
intentional discrimination, whether or not the employers and 
associations knew or should have known." 
In concluding that the employers could be held 
vicariously liable under §1981--at least for injunctive 
relief--the district court relied upon National Labor AIL I<. /-J. 
Relations Act cases in which employers without knowledge or 
intent have been found liable for the discriminatory practices 
-------------
of the union in its operation of the hiring hall. In these 
-------~ 
_...._. .. 
cases the union has discriminated against nonunion members, a 
practice forbidden by 29 u.s.c. §158 (a) (1). Certain of the 
circuits have held that in these situations the union is ·~ 
acting as the employer's hiring agent. As such, the employe ~  
oft 4 
is liable as the agent's principal. It appears that t~ CA2 ~ . 
subscribes to ' this theory of liability although it is not lA • .J.~..I.A~ 
~~ 
clear that any of the other court of appeal share this theory 
of liability. 
~
In addition, the court relied upon Title VII and 
§1981 decisions holding an employer liable for participating 
in a collective bargaining agreement with a seniority system 
that perpetuates past discrimination. Although these cases 
were decided before the Cburt's decision in International 




(1977), in which the Court upheld bona fide seniority systems, 
the cases were still authority for the proposition that "all 
parties to a collective bargaining agreement which by its 
terms has a discriminatory impact can bear civil rights 
responsibility." p. 155. These cases indicate that the 
employer has an affirmative duty to prevent discrimination 
arising from the collective bargaining agreement. 
Finally, the court found that respondeat superior 
was ap~ately applied to civil r .ights cases brought under 
§1981.- Monell was a §1983 suit and rested heavily on 
statutory language and legislative history inapplicable to 
§1981. ~zzo v • . Goode, 423 u.s. 362 (1976) is distinguishable 
since it involved considerations of comity and since it did 
-· 
not involve a true employer/employee relationship. In short 
"[b]ecause the complete inapplicability here of 
•, 
consideations of federal-state comity, absolute municipal 
immunity, and immunity of governmental supervisory personnel" 
Monell and Rizzo had no bearing in the present case. The 
court concluded the respondeat superior was properly applied 
to a §1981 suit. 
And if properly applied, the theory of respondeat 
\ 
superior would lead to liability of the employers in this f)c_ 
case: "under every 'test of , agency the union hiring hall was ·C 
the agent' for ·two ·principals--the union and the contractors, ~ '' 
JA.4..<-
with their respective associations ..•• The union hiring hall ~ 
was, after all, designed to supply the employers with workers~~ 
.~ ' 





and replace the traditional system of direct applications." p. ~ 
The court argued that "the duty to see that ~ 
h~ 
162. 
discrimination does not take place in the selection of one's 
workforce must remain with the employer if it is to have 
full meaning." p. 165. Moreover, the fact that this was a 
t I "'-
ClaSS action made no difference: "It is the mass of employers 
collectively who by originally agreeing to or subsequently _____, 
adopting the exclusive hiring hall provision effectuated a 
v¥ ----"> " t ollective delegation of the employment application process." 
p. 165. 
In short: 
"Although plaintiffs have failed to show 
intent to discriminate by the employers as a class, 
and indeed have been unable to show knowledge or 
notice of discrimination by that class as a whole, 
plaintiffs have shown that the requisite 
relationship exix~s among__. employers, associations, 
and union to render applicable the theory of 
respondeat superior, thus making employers and 
associations liable injunc~vely for the 
discriminatory acts of the union."p. 166. 
2. §1985 
Turning to the conspiracy claim under §1985, the 
district court found no liability. No vicarious liability 
theory can be used to hold a class of employers liable to 
commit a conspiracy. Although the associations might have 
been thought to have conspired with the union in tricking the 
:< 
12. 
federal government into dropping the Philadelphia Plan, mere 
recklessness would not suffice to establish conspiracy. 
E. Appropriateness of the Defendant Class 
Having established liability of the class of all 
employers, the court turned to consider several procedural 
questions concerning application of Rule 23 and personal 
jurisdiction over defendant class members. 
1. Rule 23 (a) 
The court found that a defendant class of employers 
was properly constituted under rule 23 (a) and that Glascow, 
Inc. was an adequate representative. The court found that 
there was no difference of interests among the members of the 
defendant class. 
2. Rule 23(b) 
The court rejected the argument that the class of 
1 defendants could only be certified under Rule 23 (b) (3) which 
would permit any individual member to opt out after notice. 
The court found that 23(b) (2) was the appropriate section. 
The importance of a b(2) certification was clear in a case 
such as this because make-whole 
employment discrimination could not 
particular defendant. 
injunctive relief from 
be ordered against any 
13. 
3. Standing 
Related to the question of certification, is the 
question of whether the named plaintiffs {12 black workers} 
have standing to sue a class of defendants when some of the 
defendant are employers by whom no named plaintiff was 
employed as well as employers operating outside of the area of 
residence of all named plaintiffs. The court considered that 
there was standing in a case such as this involving civil 
rights violations and a joint hiring hall. Moreover, all 
plaintiffs have standing to sue the Local. 
4. Personal Jurisdiction 
The court found that it had personal jurisdiction 
based on Hansberry v. Lee, 311 u.s. 32 {1940}, and the 
adequate representation provided by the named defendants. 
Particularly since the basis for liability was vicarious and 
because only injunctive relief was granted there was no basis 
for arguing thatGlasgow, Inc. was not an adequate 
representative. Because notice was provided to the unnamed 
members of the defendant class by certified mail two years 




The district judge ordered r~tas and a five J 
minority job training program. Judge Bechtle, who 
14. 
succeeded to the case after Judge Higginbotham was appointed 
to the CA3, ordered that the Union and JATC pay 40% and 25% 
respectively of the expenses of this program, that the 
employer class pay 5%, and that the three associations pay 10% 




To: Justice Powell 
From: David 
Re: Genral Building Contractors Assn. v. Pennsylvania--No. 81-280 etc 
I thought you might find it useful to have the first -
part of this bench memo. I will give you an analysis section early 
-------------------next week, but Judge Higginbotham's opinion was so long that you 
may find this redaction useful. 
From my quick reading of the briefs I gather that this 
is not so much a case in which to decide if intent is a requirement 
in section 1981 suits. Rather, it is a vicarious liability or 
respondeat superior case. I believe we have granted another case in 
which to decide if discriminato ry intent must always be shown in 
~uits. Here, however, the district judge found intent 
~ on the part of the union. The question is whether the employer can 
1\, 
be tarred by the same brush. This case, Hydrolevel, and Claiborne 
Hardware show a striking resurgence of the law of agency in modern 
contexts. Maybe they will have to start teaching it again. 
81-280 GENERAL BLDG. v. PA. Argued 3/3/82 
v~~~~~~ 
f/- ~~~ ~ ~co..~4 
~ ~d;j'~~~~ 
~ }'kc~ (~/k·L 1_~ 
tJ~ ~~)·4-.-~4; 
~) wvClv  - ,v d-f-~ 
JN· 011:1 1 a--=~~ ~ ~·5  r AF-~ 
•1-vu-IJ.j 1~44-a¢ ~)~ 
~~4/u:;__~. ~~~~­
~~. (O-b<-f7s--~ 1'~$1h--
13~1~ d-qtj ~~~) ~/ ~4.-
~----
' 'X X: )C._ 
~~M-~IAA-/k.r'!J ~-;: 
I I CJ-t,v ~ ( ~} 17~·~ ~ . t.£.<., ~ j/ 
~~~~uu;t lt:fJ'/~'d-~ 
t£.1-~J P'V 
2 . C1:-r_. ~~ ~J U-«.~~'1/ iUJ._ 
~~ ~~~ ~}-, '-~~~r 
~ ...... ~~~s · 
;x. 7( '-.L. 
/s-oo ~~~ ~ ~ ~ 
~~~. ·~/2.<.-0 




~~~~·~-1--o~ .. ~ 
~L~~~"f~ 
... ,. '!o': 
'' 
l~tq-(6vv~ ~) 
5~~d ~.' ~~17?/ 










' ' . 
- ~~~~~~ 
f'h,i/' 11!'1  ~ ~~ 
Ylw-114!"1 ~J:o~~ 
-~ ~~)-~ 91--~(~ 
T&~ kJl~ ~ ~~ -~ ltlTI-
~~~~~~ 
'7~(-~~~~Tv 11- v IJ-u-/ 








~~ -bp~ w/o ~"(~.4,/!"~ 






No. 81-280 General Building v. P~. 
Conf. 3/5/82 
The Chief Justice ~ 
~ £,..,.:,.., ~.a ~ ~ ~ f, "1 ~#V. 
~ ~~ ~.,I.{) If/ L J(' ~ J "* ~ ce'.- 4"""-' ~ ..fA-c ~ .-l.t 
Vf~~,.._.~~tl?l~·l~w.w.l~~· 
~~C¥-~,--~~~~~-
IJL. 1'~~~. #K/  J2u, ~ 
~. .,. ..... )}.~ ~ .42 ......,.,~.~ ..,..__ tJ.eJ ~ ~ , 
~ ~fA-.!~~~, 
.9~~~.,1 4.~ 91 ~ ~ti£# b~t£.t.~L,..~ 
4-,J..c.-  ~ ~ ;4) ~ 
J ustice Brennan~~-~ Jf:e;;;~t;.e) 'H?¢~ 
,, ~~ S~· Pi-~ ~;. ~~ """-'9'-- /..44.,~ 
)4 ~ .. ~.~._~,..,.. 41 <•4' e .. .- A-4~ ~~ -"'-fh ~~~ 
 ~~ S"'~~-·-t. ~ 
~·~~e~~~~~- ::z.s~)~} 
'• ~-·.:.~d,.e,..c~c • /4.t~~~ .. ..&~~ 
-r - 1 1-tc..t.., 4--H~fl!.~ .. "" P-( ~~4 :# g"C,_, 
~4~~.· d.H-~*'~ 
¥. v~ --4-~'="-.l.llf .. -~ ~~~~ u.~ ..... 
'-1-- ~4J. ~~~~---P~ 
Justice White ~ 
J/~~~~~~UMf~ 
~·~~j-''14> ~4 d.k41..UIII~ , ~~~ 
A.. ,, ~· ~ / L? • • ~ ~ . . . 1 . /.A~ ~ ~B ~-.?.~e·~~~.,..ut~ 
~J.,....,..,~, 






Justice Marshall L2fJ-~ ....,..- .· dlliF-....... ~ .. L.c...._. k /.o'' 
~~~~~~--~~ 




Justice Rehnquist ~, 
~ ~ L.JZ,A ~_.-,At:.~-fi-·~J 
~-Lc'L<'fA-~LtJ~--~~ ~ 
~~JZ~~< 
~·t- ~L.~ P~M ~~o-f~ 
~/1 r-c. ~~~*'•'<,- ~~;Q.<,~ 
Justice Stevens /t; ._,, 
~~-I-FYI, ~A<./4;./,_...._..,___.,f-~ kJ-:::. 
~ ~~.. ......_ vu.r..v-#j ~-·~{, 14'lr1 ~4~ 
~ ~ ~~rr-~;~>~~~ ~ 
~ /J-d-a W'l~~ 
TA-re.~ •• ,~~·--,.,~~ 4L-·~-~~. 
J7~ /Be ~ h-"'".c.<..-~  
4 ~ ~ "r&:Jt:J ~~, ~~H.u;, ~ 
~~4--~)-~· 
---~rl~~;~~:v~~ 1!/'y~ 
Justice O'Connor LJ _ ~ • ~~ 
/UU~.-,~.~ 
~8--/< 
~ ~ ~c.-lt:;T/ ~a-c 
t-o~~~~~ 
~~A-c. J4J 714-IG 
J. 
~u.prtmt <!Jourl of tlp• ~b- .;§t: 'f 
'Jllas-fringtc-n. Ill· <q. 21Jgl)!..;l 
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April 13, 1982 
Re: No. 81-280, · 81-330, 81-331, 81-332, 81-333-
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April 16, 1982 
81-280 General Building Contractors v. Pennsylvania 
Dear Bill: 










.JUSTICE BYRON R . WHITE 
~ttp'Utnt <qttttrl of Hrt ~tb .ita±tS' 
Jkur!pnghm, ~. <q. 21l~Jl.~ 
April 22, 1982 
Re: 81-280, 81-330, 81-331, 81-332, 81-333 
General Building Contractors Ass'n, Inc. 
v. Pennsylvania, et al 
Dear Bill, 
Please join me. 
Sincerely yours, 
Justice Rehnquist 
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JUSTICE BYRON R. WHITE April 22, 1982 / 
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Re: 81-280, 81-330, 81-331, 81-332, 81-333 
General Building Contractors Ass'n, Inc. 
v. Pennsylvania, et al 
Dear Bill, 
Please join me. 
Sincerely yours, 
Justice Rehnquist 
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CHAMBERS OF 
JUSTICE HARRY A. BLACKMUN 









~u:prttttt C!fcmi of tirt 1ltttittlt ~fattg 
2)il as-lrittgtcn. 1B. C!f. 2.0 gt .lk ~ 
General Building Contractors 
May 10, 1982 
Assn v. Penn. 
United Engineers & Contractors, Inc. v. Penn. 
Contractors Assn of E. Penn. v. Pennsylvania 
Glasgow, Inc. v. Pennsylvania 
- Bechtel Power Corp. v. Pennsylvania 
I would be pleased if you would add my name to your 
concurring opinion with the little change you and Bill Brennan 
have worked out. 
Sincerely, 
Justice O'Connor 
cc: The Conference 
CHAMBERS OF" 
JUSTICE w .. . J . BRENNAN, JR. 
.®nptmtt <!Jcurl cf flrt~b ~tate~ 
~aglp:ngttm 19. <!J. 2.llbiJ!.~ 
May 10,1982 
RE: Nos. 81-280, etc. General Building Contractors v. 
Pennsylvania, et al. 
Dear Sandra: 
The substitution of "incidenta 1 or ancillary" for 
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